In another thread ("Lack of fog nowadays"), one thing that hasn't been
mentioned (amongst others e.g. effect on aviation), is the dramatic
impact widespread, dense & often persistent fog would have on the
railways in days not so long ago. We now have 'in-cab' signal repeaters
to ease the problem of drivers not being able to see the signals, but
until these were commonplace, fog was variously a nuisance to downright
hazard, and next year (2007) sees the 50th anniversary of one of the
worst fog-related accidents on British railways: the following are
extracts from the official Ministry of Transport & Civil Aviation report
on the accident at Lewisham - the full report can be found at:-
http://makeashorterlink.com/?U2472591E
As you can see at one point, if it had not been for the quick thinking
of the driver of the Holborn to Dartford emu, the death & injury toll
might have been even higher. As it was 90 people were killed, with many
more injured, and there was a near-total dislocation of railways
services served by these lines.
selected extracts
In the prevailing dense fog, in which the trains were running very late,
the 4.56 p.m. express passenger train from Cannon Street to Ramsgate,
via Folkestone, formed of 11 bogie coaches hauled by a "Pacific" type
engine, passed the Red aspect of the Down Through colour light inner
home signal of St. Johns signal box, and then after travelling 138 yards
it collided at about 30 m.p.h. with the rear of the 5.18 p.m. 10-coach
electric passenger train from Charing Cross to Hayes (Mid Kent line)
which was standing at the Parks Bridge Junction colour fight home
signal. The air brakes of the electric train had been applied to hold it
stationary on the rising gradient. As a consequence, the shock of the
collision was more severe than it otherwise would have been, and the
whole of the body of the eighth coach was destroyed when the underframe
and body of the ninth coach were forced over and through it. In the
Ramsgate train the rear of the engine tender and the front of the
leading coach were crushed together and thrown to the left by the sudden
stoppage, most unfortunately striking and dislodging a steel middle
column supporting two of the four heavy girders of a bridge which
carried the Nunhead-Lewisham double line over the four main tracks. The
two girders subsided at once on to the train below completing the
destruction of the leading coach and crushing the second coach and the
leading half of the third. About two minutes later, the 5.22 p.m.
8-coach electric train from Holborn Viaduct to Dartford, which was
moving slowly on to the bridge towards a signal at Red, was stopped very
promptly by the motorman when he saw the girders at an angle; this train
was neither derailed nor damaged, but the leading coach was tilted.
Owing to the disorganisation of the train services by the fog, both the
trains were crowded, and it is estimated that there were nearly 1,500
passengers in the electric train and about 700 in the steam train. It
was inevitable in these circumstances that the casualty list was very
great, and I much regret to state that 90 persons altogether lost their
lives; 88 passengers and the guard of the electric train were killed
outright, and one passenger died later of his injuries. Of the 89
fatalities to passengers, there is evidence that 37 occurred in the
electric train and 49 in the steam train. In addition a large number of
persons were conveyed to hospitals in the neighbourhood, where 109 were
detained, many with very serious injuries, and 67 others sustained minor
injuries or shock. At first it was difficult to assess the magnitude of
disaster in the fog, but as the true situation became known, the
emergency services were deployed at increasing strength, and many
doctors and nurses arrived on the scene; they all applied themselves
most efficiently to the work of rescue and first aid under exceptionally
difficult conditions; and the last of the injured had been removed to
hospital by 10.30 p.m.
All the four main tracks were blocked by the collision and immediately
after it by the fall of the bridge.
The North Kent line, which diverges at St. Johns, was not actually
blocked, but it was necessary to close it and keep the current off for
the sake of the rescue work. As a result the main line services from
Charing Cross and Cannon Street to the county of Kent had to be
cancelled, and the network of routes from these termini to the inner and
outer suburbs was also cut off, with the exception only of the double
line via Greenwich which connects at Charlton with the North Kent line.
The fallen bridge carried an important freight exchange route, on which
there were also some passenger services between Holborn Viaduct and
Dartford. The train services were disorganised by the fog before the
accident, with crowds at the London terminals. The blockage of so many
vital routes caused much inconvenience and delay and even hardship to
thousands of passengers, because it was not possible to give them any
service whatsoever towards the end of the evening peak and all
alternative means of transport were already taxed to the limit under the
prevailing conditions.
Mist and fog had been continuous in the South East throughout the 4th
December, and the fog had become thicker as darkness fell, with some
frost. By all accounts the visibility of the colour light signals on the
3 miles or so of viaduct between Cannon Street and New Cross had been
fairly good around the time of the accident, but there was little doubt
that the fog was a good deal thicker in the 3/4 mile of cutting between
New Cross and St. Johns, varying perhaps from time to time and place to
place from 20 yards or less to 50 yards or more. There was very little
wind.
/selected extracts
.... those were the days?
Martin.
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