www.NO2ID.net

More than a card - a new way of life

The ID Card scheme is not just a harmless new bit of plastic in your wallet.
It requires a massive and intrusive database that changes the nature of UK
Citizenship and shifts the balance of power further away from the citizen to
the State. With the National Identity Register (NIR) and ID Card, the
Government will control your identity. It will decide who you are. Showing
ID to officials will become an everyday part of British life. Although other
Europeans are used to ID Cards the NIR is much more controlling than their
ID Card systems and they have legal safeguards we do not. It will open your
life to inspection by thousands of bureaucrats.

Spiraling costs

Even the Government admits the minimum cost is E5.8 billion - that's six
domes! That estimate has doubled since 2004. And it only counts Home Office
costs and not the penalties for errors, or the cost of policing many new
offences. The Government is reducing the Civil Service but is building a
whole new Identity Service. Taxpayers and businesses will have to pay yet
more for special scanners in doctors' surgeries, benefit offices, banks and
even hotels.

The biggest ever White Elephant

Big Government computer systems are a catalogue of disaster. Yet this is the
biggest and most complicated government computer scheme anywhere, ever. Even
if it works perfectly, the ID scheme cannot meet the problems it is supposed
to solve. The Government admits that the NIR will not stop terrorism. Almost
all benefit fraud is lying about circumstances, not who
you are. A single master document makes identity theft easier, and more
worthwhile, not harder. Criminals don't play by the bureaucratic rules. ID
Cards won't cut crime.

A tool for bullies

With a wink to racists, the Government says ID will stop illegal
immigration. But it doesn't in the rest of Europe. Asians and black people
often feel they are unfairly stopped and searched by police already. ID will
give more reasons to "check" people. What's more, demands to prove you are
British will creep into more and more public and private services, with the
system as an excuse. How does a divided society make you safer?

And when it goes wrong? -- You, the suspect

You are about to be fingerprinted, eye-scanned and tagged like a criminal.
Any errors will be your responsibility. The Home Office will have the final
say. Even now about 100 people a month (out of a few thousand checked) are
wrongly marked as criminals by the Criminal Records Bureau. The NIR could
mean several checks a day for everybody. What happens to your life when the
scanner fails or there's a mistake?

Say NO to ID

The ID scheme is expensive and socially destructive. Either it will help
make Britain a police-state, or it will be a bigger white elephant than the
poll tax. Help us stop it.

This briefing summarises N02ID's key concerns with the Governments
proposals. More detailed discussion and research references are available on
request. You can find more information at www.no2id.net


The government ID scheme: what you need to know

1. Not just a card. The card is the least of it...

- The proposed identity management system has multiple layers: The NIR
(National Identification Register) - individual checking and numbering of
the population - marking many personal details as "registrable facts' to be
disclosed and constantly updated - collection and checking of biometrics
(e.g. fingerprints) - the card itself - a widespread scanner network and
secure (one hopes) infrastructure connecting it to the central database -
provision for use across the private and public sectors - datasharing
between organisations on an unprecedented scale.

- Massive accumulation of personal data: 50 categories of "registrable
fact''' are set out in the Act, though they could be added to. Effectively
an index to all other official and quasi-official records, through
cross-references and an audit trail of all checks on the Register, the NIR
would be the key to a total life history of every individual, to be retained
even after death.

- Lifelong surveillance and the meta-database: Every registered individual
will be under an obligation to notify any change in registrable facts. It is
a clear aim of the system to require identity verification for many more
civil transactions, the occasions to be stored in the audit trail.
Information verified and indexed by numbers from the NIR would be easily
cross-referenced in any database or set of databases The "rneta-database" of
all the thousands of databases cross-referenced is much more powerful and
much less secure than the NIR itself

- Overseas ID cards are not comparable: Many western countries that have ID
cards do not have a shared register. Mostly ID cards have been limited in
use, with strong legal privacy protections. In Germany centralisation is
forbidden for historical reasons. and when cards are replaced, the records
are not finked. Belgium has made use of modern encryption methods and local
storage to protect privacy and prevent data-sharing, an approach opposite to
the Home Office's. The UK scheme is closest to those of some Middle Eastern
countries and of the People's Republic of China-though the latter has
largely given up on biometrics.

2. The Government has not made a case. There is no evidence the system will
produce the stated benefits. Less liberty does not imply greater security.

- Terrorism: ID does not establish intention. Competent criminals and
terrorists will be able to subvert the identity system. Random outrages by
individuals can't be stopped. Ministers agree that ID cards will not prevent
atrocities. A blank assertion that the department would find it helpful is
not an argument that would be entertained for fundamental change in any
other sphere of government but national security. Where is the evidence?
Research suggests there is no link between the use of identity cards and the
prevalence of terrorism and in no instance has the presence of an identity
card system been shown a significant deterrent to terrorist activity.
Experts attest that ID unjustifiably presumed secure actually diminishes
security.'

- Illegal immigration and working: People will still enter Britain using
foreign documents-genuine or forged-and ID cards offer no more deterrent to
people smugglers than passports and visas. Employers already face
substantial penalties for failing to obtain proof of entitlement to work,
yet there are only a handful of prosecutions a year. Benefit fraud and abuse
of public services: Identity is "only a tiny part of the problem in the
benefit system."' Figures for claims under false identity are estimated at
£50 million (2.5%) of an (estimated) £2 billion per year in fraudulent
claims.

- `Identity fraud': Both Australia and the USA have far worse problems of
identity theft than Britain, precisely because of general reliance on a
single reference source. Costs usually cited for of identityrelated crime
here include much fraud not susceptible to an ID system. So-called "secure",
trusted, ID is more useful to the fraudster. The Home Office has not
explained how it will stop identity thieves registering as other people.
Coherent collection of all sensitive personal data by govemment, and its
easy transmission between departments, will create vast new opportunities
for data-theft.

3. Overcomplicated, unproven technology

- Computer system: IT providers find that identity systems work best when
limited in design. The Home Office scheme combines untested technologies on
an unparalleled scale. Its many inchoate purposes create innumerable points
for failure. The government record with computer projects is poor, and the
ID system is likely to end up a broken mess.

- Biometrics: Not all biometrics will work for all people. Plenty are
missing digits, or eyes, or have physical conditions that render one or more
biometrics unstable or hard to read. All systems have error. Deployment on a
vast scale, with variably trained operators and variably maintained and
calibrated equipment, will produce vast numbers of mismatches. leading to
potentially gross inconvenience to millions.

4. Identity Cards will cost money that could be better spent

- No ceiling: The Government has not ventured figures for the cost to the
country as whole of the identity management scheme. That makes evaluation
difficult. Civil Service IT experience suggests current projections are
likely to be seriously underestimated. Home Office figures are for internal
costs and have risen sharply where they are not utterly obscure. Industry
estimates suggest that public and private sector compliance costs could
easily be double whatever is spent centrally.

- Opportunity costs: The Government has not even tried to show that national
ID management will be more cost-effective than less spectacular alternative,
targeted. solutions to the same problems (whether tried and tested or novel)
We are to trust to luck that it is.

- Taxpayer pain: Even at current Home Office estimates, the additional tax
burden of setting up the scheme will be of the order of £200 per person. The
direct cost to individuals (of a combined passport ;,and iD card package) is
quoted as £.93. The impact on other departmental and local authority budgets
is unknown. The scope and impact of arbitrary penalties would make speed
cameras trivial by comparison.

5. Unchecked executive powers.

- Broad delegated power: The Home Office seeks wide discretion over the
future shape of the scheme. There are more than 30 types of regulatory power
for future Secretaries of State would change the functions and content of
the system ad lib. The scope, application and possible extension are
extra-parliamentary decisions, even if nominally subject to approval.

- Presumption of accuracy: Data entered onto the National Identity Register
(NIR) is arbitrarily presumed to be accurate, and the Home Secretary is the
judge of whether information provided to him is a, :curate. Meanwhile, the
Home Office gets the power to enter information without informing the
individual. But there's no duty to ensure that such data is accurate, or
criterion of accuracy. Personal identity is implicitly made wholly subject
to state control.

- Compulsion by stealth: Even during the so-called `voluntary' phase, the
Home Secretary can add any person to the Register without their consent, and
categories of individuals might be compelled selectively to register using
powers under any future legislation. Anyone newly applying for a passport or
other "designated document", or renewing an existing one, will automatically
have to be interviewed and submit all required details. This is less a
"phased" introduction than a clandestine one. There is to be no choice. And
the minimum of notice to the public about the change in the handling of
their registrable information.

- Limited oversight: As proposed, the National Identity Scheme Commissioner
would have very limited powers and is excluded from considering a number of
key issues. He does not even report directly to Parliament. The reliance on
administrative penalties means severe punishments may be inflicted without
judicial process. The onus is on the individual to seek relief from the
courts, at a civil standard of proof. Those who most require the protection
of a fair trial are the least likely to be able to resort to legal action.

- Individuals managed by executive order: Without reference to the courts or
any appeals process, the Home Secretary may cancel or require surrender of
an identity card, without a right of appeal, at any time. Given that the
object of the scheme is that an ID card will be eventually required to
exercise any ordinary civil function, this amounts to granting the Home
Secretary the power of civic life and death.

6. The National Identity Register creates specific new threats to
individuals

- Discrimination-no guarantees: There have been vapid "assurances" made to
some minority groups". That underlines the potential for threat. The system
offers a ready-made police-state tool for a future government less
trustworthy than the current one. A Home Secretary could create
classifications of individuals to be registered as he sees fit, introdcuing
onerous duties backed by severe penalties for fractions of the population.
Religious or ethnic affiliation, for example, could be added to the Register
by regulation-or be inferred by cross-referencing other information using a
National Identity Register Number or associated data.

- `Papers, please': ID cards in practice would provide a pretext for those
in authority-public or private-to question individuals who stand out for
reasons of personal appearance or demeanour. This is likely to exacerbate
divisions in society. The Chairman of the Bar Council has asked, "is there
not a great risk that those who feel at the margins of society - the
somewhat disaffected - will be driven into the arms of extremists?

- Third party abuse: The requirement that all those registered notify all
changes in details risks creating the means of tracking and persecution
through improper use of the database. A variety of persons have good reason
to conceal their identity and whereabouts, for example: those fleeing
domestic abuse; victims of "honour" crimes; witnesses in criminal cases;
those at risk of kidnapping; undercover investigators; refugees from
oppressive regimes overseas; those pursued by the press; those who may be
terrorist targets. The seizure of ID cards (like benefit-books and passports
now) will become a means for extortion by gangsters.

- Lost identity, becoming an un-person: By making ordinary life dependent on
the reliability of a complex administrative system, the scheme makes myriad
small errors potentially catastrophic. There's no hint from the government
how it will deal with inevitably large numbers of mis-identifications and
errors, or deliberate attacks on or corruption of what would become a
critical piece of national infrastructure. A failure in any part of the
system at a check might deny a person access to his or her rights or
property or to public services, with no immediate solution or
redress-"license to live" withdrawn.

Visit www.no2id.net today!

"Chris White" wrote in message
...
www.NO2ID.net

More than a card - a new way of life

The ID Card scheme is not just a harmless new bit of plastic in your
wallet.
It requires a massive and intrusive database that changes the nature of UK
Citizenship and shifts the balance of power further away from the citizen
to
the State. With the National Identity Register (NIR) and ID Card, the
Government will control your identity. It will decide who you are. Showing
ID to officials will become an everyday part of British life. Although
other
Europeans are used to ID Cards the NIR is much more controlling than their
ID Card systems and they have legal safeguards we do not. It will open
your
life to inspection by thousands of bureaucrats.

Spiraling costs

Even the Government admits the minimum cost is E5.8 billion - that's six
domes! That estimate has doubled since 2004. And it only counts Home
Office
costs and not the penalties for errors, or the cost of policing many new
offences. The Government is reducing the Civil Service but is building a
whole new Identity Service. Taxpayers and businesses will have to pay yet
more for special scanners in doctors' surgeries, benefit offices, banks
and
even hotels.

The biggest ever White Elephant

Big Government computer systems are a catalogue of disaster. Yet this is
the
biggest and most complicated government computer scheme anywhere, ever.
Even
if it works perfectly, the ID scheme cannot meet the problems it is
supposed
to solve. The Government admits that the NIR will not stop terrorism.
Almost
all benefit fraud is lying about circumstances, not who
you are. A single master document makes identity theft easier, and more
worthwhile, not harder. Criminals don't play by the bureaucratic rules. ID
Cards won't cut crime.

A tool for bullies

With a wink to racists, the Government says ID will stop illegal
immigration. But it doesn't in the rest of Europe. Asians and black people
often feel they are unfairly stopped and searched by police already. ID
will
give more reasons to "check" people. What's more, demands to prove you are
British will creep into more and more public and private services, with
the
system as an excuse. How does a divided society make you safer?

And when it goes wrong? -- You, the suspect

You are about to be fingerprinted, eye-scanned and tagged like a criminal.
Any errors will be your responsibility. The Home Office will have the
final
say. Even now about 100 people a month (out of a few thousand checked) are
wrongly marked as criminals by the Criminal Records Bureau. The NIR could
mean several checks a day for everybody. What happens to your life when
the
scanner fails or there's a mistake?

Say NO to ID

The ID scheme is expensive and socially destructive. Either it will help
make Britain a police-state, or it will be a bigger white elephant than
the
poll tax. Help us stop it.

This briefing summarises N02ID's key concerns with the Governments
proposals. More detailed discussion and research references are available
on
request. You can find more information at www.no2id.net


The government ID scheme: what you need to know

1. Not just a card. The card is the least of it...

- The proposed identity management system has multiple layers: The NIR
(National Identification Register) - individual checking and numbering of
the population - marking many personal details as "registrable facts' to
be
disclosed and constantly updated - collection and checking of biometrics
(e.g. fingerprints) - the card itself - a widespread scanner network and
secure (one hopes) infrastructure connecting it to the central database -
provision for use across the private and public sectors - datasharing
between organisations on an unprecedented scale.

- Massive accumulation of personal data: 50 categories of "registrable
fact''' are set out in the Act, though they could be added to. Effectively
an index to all other official and quasi-official records, through
cross-references and an audit trail of all checks on the Register, the NIR
would be the key to a total life history of every individual, to be
retained
even after death.

- Lifelong surveillance and the meta-database: Every registered individual
will be under an obligation to notify any change in registrable facts. It
is
a clear aim of the system to require identity verification for many more
civil transactions, the occasions to be stored in the audit trail.
Information verified and indexed by numbers from the NIR would be easily
cross-referenced in any database or set of databases The "rneta-database"
of
all the thousands of databases cross-referenced is much more powerful and
much less secure than the NIR itself

- Overseas ID cards are not comparable: Many western countries that have
ID
cards do not have a shared register. Mostly ID cards have been limited in
use, with strong legal privacy protections. In Germany centralisation is
forbidden for historical reasons. and when cards are replaced, the records
are not finked. Belgium has made use of modern encryption methods and
local
storage to protect privacy and prevent data-sharing, an approach opposite
to
the Home Office's. The UK scheme is closest to those of some Middle
Eastern
countries and of the People's Republic of China-though the latter has
largely given up on biometrics.

2. The Government has not made a case. There is no evidence the system
will
produce the stated benefits. Less liberty does not imply greater security.

- Terrorism: ID does not establish intention. Competent criminals and
terrorists will be able to subvert the identity system. Random outrages by
individuals can't be stopped. Ministers agree that ID cards will not
prevent
atrocities. A blank assertion that the department would find it helpful is
not an argument that would be entertained for fundamental change in any
other sphere of government but national security. Where is the evidence?
Research suggests there is no link between the use of identity cards and
the
prevalence of terrorism and in no instance has the presence of an identity
card system been shown a significant deterrent to terrorist activity.
Experts attest that ID unjustifiably presumed secure actually diminishes
security.'

- Illegal immigration and working: People will still enter Britain using
foreign documents-genuine or forged-and ID cards offer no more deterrent
to
people smugglers than passports and visas. Employers already face
substantial penalties for failing to obtain proof of entitlement to work,
yet there are only a handful of prosecutions a year. Benefit fraud and
abuse
of public services: Identity is "only a tiny part of the problem in the
benefit system."' Figures for claims under false identity are estimated at
£50 million (2.5%) of an (estimated) £2 billion per year in fraudulent
claims.

- `Identity fraud': Both Australia and the USA have far worse problems of
identity theft than Britain, precisely because of general reliance on a
single reference source. Costs usually cited for of identityrelated crime
here include much fraud not susceptible to an ID system. So-called
"secure",
trusted, ID is more useful to the fraudster. The Home Office has not
explained how it will stop identity thieves registering as other people.
Coherent collection of all sensitive personal data by govemment, and its
easy transmission between departments, will create vast new opportunities
for data-theft.

3. Overcomplicated, unproven technology

- Computer system: IT providers find that identity systems work best when
limited in design. The Home Office scheme combines untested technologies
on
an unparalleled scale. Its many inchoate purposes create innumerable
points
for failure. The government record with computer projects is poor, and the
ID system is likely to end up a broken mess.

- Biometrics: Not all biometrics will work for all people. Plenty are
missing digits, or eyes, or have physical conditions that render one or
more
biometrics unstable or hard to read. All systems have error. Deployment on
a
vast scale, with variably trained operators and variably maintained and
calibrated equipment, will produce vast numbers of mismatches. leading to
potentially gross inconvenience to millions.

4. Identity Cards will cost money that could be better spent

- No ceiling: The Government has not ventured figures for the cost to the
country as whole of the identity management scheme. That makes evaluation
difficult. Civil Service IT experience suggests current projections are
likely to be seriously underestimated. Home Office figures are for
internal
costs and have risen sharply where they are not utterly obscure. Industry
estimates suggest that public and private sector compliance costs could
easily be double whatever is spent centrally.

- Opportunity costs: The Government has not even tried to show that
national
ID management will be more cost-effective than less spectacular
alternative,
targeted. solutions to the same problems (whether tried and tested or
novel)
We are to trust to luck that it is.

- Taxpayer pain: Even at current Home Office estimates, the additional tax
burden of setting up the scheme will be of the order of £200 per person.
The
direct cost to individuals (of a combined passport ;,and iD card package)
is
quoted as £.93. The impact on other departmental and local authority
budgets
is unknown. The scope and impact of arbitrary penalties would make speed
cameras trivial by comparison.

5. Unchecked executive powers.

- Broad delegated power: The Home Office seeks wide discretion over the
future shape of the scheme. There are more than 30 types of regulatory
power
for future Secretaries of State would change the functions and content of
the system ad lib. The scope, application and possible extension are
extra-parliamentary decisions, even if nominally subject to approval.

- Presumption of accuracy: Data entered onto the National Identity
Register
(NIR) is arbitrarily presumed to be accurate, and the Home Secretary is
the
judge of whether information provided to him is a, :curate. Meanwhile, the
Home Office gets the power to enter information without informing the
individual. But there's no duty to ensure that such data is accurate, or
criterion of accuracy. Personal identity is implicitly made wholly subject
to state control.

- Compulsion by stealth: Even during the so-called `voluntary' phase, the
Home Secretary can add any person to the Register without their consent,
and
categories of individuals might be compelled selectively to register using
powers under any future legislation. Anyone newly applying for a passport
or
other "designated document", or renewing an existing one, will
automatically
have to be interviewed and submit all required details. This is less a
"phased" introduction than a clandestine one. There is to be no choice.
And
the minimum of notice to the public about the change in the handling of
their registrable information.

- Limited oversight: As proposed, the National Identity Scheme
Commissioner
would have very limited powers and is excluded from considering a number
of
key issues. He does not even report directly to Parliament. The reliance
on
administrative penalties means severe punishments may be inflicted without
judicial process. The onus is on the individual to seek relief from the
courts, at a civil standard of proof. Those who most require the
protection
of a fair trial are the least likely to be able to resort to legal action.

- Individuals managed by executive order: Without reference to the courts
or
any appeals process, the Home Secretary may cancel or require surrender of
an identity card, without a right of appeal, at any time. Given that the
object of the scheme is that an ID card will be eventually required to
exercise any ordinary civil function, this amounts to granting the Home
Secretary the power of civic life and death.

6. The National Identity Register creates specific new threats to
individuals

- Discrimination-no guarantees: There have been vapid "assurances" made to
some minority groups". That underlines the potential for threat. The
system
offers a ready-made police-state tool for a future government less
trustworthy than the current one. A Home Secretary could create
classifications of individuals to be registered as he sees fit,
introdcuing
onerous duties backed by severe penalties for fractions of the population.
Religious or ethnic affiliation, for example, could be added to the
Register
by regulation-or be inferred by cross-referencing other information using
a
National Identity Register Number or associated data.

- `Papers, please': ID cards in practice would provide a pretext for those
in authority-public or private-to question individuals who stand out for
reasons of personal appearance or demeanour. This is likely to exacerbate
divisions in society. The Chairman of the Bar Council has asked, "is there
not a great risk that those who feel at the margins of society - the
somewhat disaffected - will be driven into the arms of extremists?

- Third party abuse: The requirement that all those registered notify all
changes in details risks creating the means of tracking and persecution
through improper use of the database. A variety of persons have good
reason
to conceal their identity and whereabouts, for example: those fleeing
domestic abuse; victims of "honour" crimes; witnesses in criminal cases;
those at risk of kidnapping; undercover investigators; refugees from
oppressive regimes overseas; those pursued by the press; those who may be
terrorist targets. The seizure of ID cards (like benefit-books and
passports
now) will become a means for extortion by gangsters.

- Lost identity, becoming an un-person: By making ordinary life dependent
on
the reliability of a complex administrative system, the scheme makes
myriad
small errors potentially catastrophic. There's no hint from the government
how it will deal with inevitably large numbers of mis-identifications and
errors, or deliberate attacks on or corruption of what would become a
critical piece of national infrastructure. A failure in any part of the
system at a check might deny a person access to his or her rights or
property or to public services, with no immediate solution or
redress-"license to live" withdrawn.

Visit www.no2id.net today!



Whatever this scheme might do, the one thing it won't do is stop terrorism.
Most of those involved in 7/7 and 21/7 had genuine British passports, as did
some of the Glasgow/London car bombers.

Didn't the UK fight a major war about 65 years ago so that British citizens
did not find themselves subject to arbitrary demands in the streets and in
their homes for "Papieren, bitte!"?

--
Mike Dworetsky

(Remove pants sp*mbl*ck to reply)

Didn't the UK fight a major war about 65 years ago so that British citizens
did not find themselves subject to arbitrary demands in the streets and in
their homes for "Papieren, bitte!"?

--
Mike Dworetsky



During that war all and for years afterwards all British citizens
carried ID cards.
I still have mine. The war was against Fascism not ID cards.

On Fri, 1 Feb 2008 at 14:56:01, Mike Collins wrote in
uk.sci.weather :

Didn't the UK fight a major war about 65 years ago so that British citizens
did not find themselves subject to arbitrary demands in the streets and in
their homes for "Papieren, bitte!"?

During that war all and for years afterwards all British citizens
carried ID cards.
I still have mine. The war was against Fascism not ID cards.

And it was excessive arbitrary demands to see them by petty bureaucrats,
that led to their abolition in the early 50's.
--
Paul Hyett, Cheltenham (change 'invalid83261' to 'blueyonder' to email me)

"Mike Collins" wrote in message
...

Didn't the UK fight a major war about 65 years ago so that British
citizens
did not find themselves subject to arbitrary demands in the streets and
in
their homes for "Papieren, bitte!"?

--
Mike Dworetsky



During that war all and for years afterwards all British citizens
carried ID cards.
I still have mine. The war was against Fascism not ID cards.

They were introduced as a wartime measure. But yours is a souvenir now.
Weren't they mainly used to enable post-war rationing rather than security?
And they were abolished (I don't know the exact date, late 1940s, early
1950s?).

--
Mike Dworetsky

(Remove pants sp*mbl*ck to reply)